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RECENT BOOKS
BooK REVIEWS
MASs COMMUNICATIONS LAw: CAsEs AND COMMENT. By Donald
M. Gillmor and Jerome A. Barron. West. 1969. Pp. xxvi, 853. $12.50.

I read the news today ... oh boy.•

Read the news today, and it will quickly become apparent why
Gillmor and Barron's excellent and valuable case book is so timely.
Jtem: On November 14, 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew
criticized the television networks for their "instant analysis and
querulous criticism" of President Nixon's November 3, 1969, Vietnam speech. 1 Although the network heads responded with eloquent
statements of determination to resist governmental commands, they
did not give one minute of live or special network coverage to the
largest demonstration in American history-the antiwar demonstration on November 15, 1969, in Washington, D.C. Moreover,
when the President again spoke on Vietnam, on December 8, 1969,
the networks were silent; and ABC and CBS made no immediate
comment following President Nixon's December 15, 1969, announcement of troop withdrawals from Vietnam. TV Guide observed that
the Vice President's "scolding of the networks apparently had the
desired result ... .''2
Item: The public has recently learned that for years United
States district attorneys have been issuing subpoenas to numerous
national newspapers, magazines, television networks and stations,
and news reporters, ordering them to turn over their notes, correspondence, telephone-call memoranda, and unedited tapes and film
("outtakes") for apparent use in criminal prosecutions against persons who criticized the Government.3 The minute this surprising
news broke, confidential news sources began to dry up. Walter
Cronkite reported that during the first week there were two instances
in which officials refused to "talk off the record" for fear that their
remarks would be used in court.4 Television officials advocated destroying or erasing film or video tape within twelve hours after
broadcast, and Broadcasting magazine reported that one unidentified
station "already is destroying unused tape recordings." 5
• The Beatles, "A Day in the Life," Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band
(Capitol).
I. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at I, col. 2.
2. TV GumE, Jan. 3, 1970, at I. Indeed, the Vice President himself recently reflected:
"Sometimes when I look around [at] the tube from time to time, I think I have had a
modicum of success .•••" J. Osborn, Agnew's Effect, THE NEW REPUBUc, Feb. 28, 1970,
at 13-14.
3. See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text.
4. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 58.
5. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60.
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Item: On December I, 1969, Senator Pastore's Communications
Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee spent several
hours berating the commissioners of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) for failing to prosecute certain radio broadcasters
for the alleged "obscenity," "filth," "smut," and "gutter language"
contained in certain records, poems, and plays that were broadcast by
their radio stations. 6 FCC Chairman Dean Burch reasssured Senator
Pastore that the Commission would move quickly to punish broadcasters for speech prohibited by the broad statutory rubric of
"obscene, indecent, or profane language," 7 and he reported that he
had already obtained the willingness of Deputy Attorney General
Kleindienst to initiate criminal prosecutions in such cases. 8 Shortly
thereafter, the FCC majority, with Commissioners Cox and Johnson
dissenting, reversed its long-established policy against penalizing
broadcasters for "a few isolated programs," and placed a Seattle
station on a probationary one-year license renewal for accidentally
broadcasting a few four-letter words which, although not ruled
"obscene, indecent, or profane language" by the FCC, allegedly violated the station's own standards of propriety. 9
Item: Early in 1969, at the urging of various lobbies from the
broadcasting industry, Senator Pastore proposed legislation that
would prevent citizens' groups from filing competing applications for
the licenses of existing stations which the challengers felt were not
serving the public interest.10 If enacted into law, this bill might easily
convert a broadcaster's presently "temporary" three-year license,
which is subject to renewal by the FCC, into a monopoly grant in
perpetuity. Although certain citizens' groups expressed strong disapproval of the bill,11 over one hundred senators and congressmen
quickly moved to support it. What congressman, after all, can resist
with impunity the demands of his home-state media when he is able
to communicate with his electorate only at that media's pleasure?
Item: On January 15, 1969, the FCC accomplished much of
6. Hearings on S. 2001, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 343 (1969).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
8. Hearings on S. 2001, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, at 343, 367 (1969).
9. Jackstraw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, 18 P &: F RADIO REG. 2d 414
(1970). See also Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHY-FM), 18 P &: F RADIO REG. 2d 860 (1970)
(FCC 70-346, released April 3, 1970, notice of apparent liability).
10. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
11. For example, Black Efforts for Soul in Television (B.E.S.T.) charged that S. 2004
was "back door racism" and would exclude minorities from access to media ownership
in most large communities; the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
(N.C.C.B.) argued that the Senate Bill would perpetuate excessive concentrations of
media control; and the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.) warned that S. 2004
would remove "competition" from the system of broadcast regulation and would
"freeze out every underrepresented class in Atnerican Society."
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Senator Pastore's work for him by adopting, over Commissioner
Johnson's dissent, a "Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants." 12 The policy statement announced that the FCC would refuse even to consider applications
by citizens' groups for existing stations if the incumbent licensee
could show that his programming was "substantially attuned to
meeting the needs and interests of its area," 13 no matter how superior
the challenger's programming proposals were, or how monopolistic
the incumbent licensee might be.
Item: In 1968, two citizens of Salt Lake City filed complaints with
the FCC arguing that the license of KSL-AM, owned by the Mormon
Church, should not be renewed. The complainants based their
challenge to renewal partially on the grounds of monopoly-referring
to the Mormon Church's control over KSL-FM, KSL-TV, Brigham
Young University's FM-TV complex, and one of Salt Lake City's two
daily newspapers. The Commission twice rejected these complaints,
on the theory that media ownership patterns should not be changed
by ad hoc citizens' petitions. 14 Unfortunately, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,111
holding that the FCC was not compelled by its statutory mandate to
resolve questions of excessive media concentration on individual
cases as they arose, but could, in its discretion, settle them in general
rule-making proceedings. Until the FCC reverses its position, therefore, citizens may have lost their right to challenge license renewals
on grounds of "undue concentration of control."
Item: For many years, the FCC has required broadcasters to
survey the needs and interests of their communities periodically by
consulting with community leaders and other individuals and then
broadcasting programs that respond to these needs and interests. This
requirement is, perhaps, the only effective "handle" by which the
FCC can ensure that broadcasters provide some community-service
programming. On March 2, 1970, however, Broadcasting magazine
reported that the FCC staff is preparing a memorandum suggesting
that the community ascertainment procedure be "scrapped."16
In sum, during the past year or so, the Administration has
moved against the news media by means of the Vice President's
speeches and the Attorney General's subpoenas; and Congress has
12. Comparative Hearing on Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P &: F RADIO
REG. 2d 1901 (1970).
13. 22 F.C.C.2d at 425, 18 P &: F RADIO REG. 2d at 1904.
14. KSL, Inc., FCC 68-1005 (Oct. 4, 1968), petition for reconsideration denied, 16
F.C.C.2d 340, 15 P &: F RAD10 REG. 2d 458 (1969).
15. Hale v. FCC, Case No. 22,751 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1970).
16. BROADCASTING, March 2, 1970, at 5.
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begun to consider Senator Pastore's license monopoly bill.17 In addition, during 1969, the FCC has begun moving against broadcasters
for their nonconventional modes of expression; it has threatened to
undermine the community ascertainment programming surveys; and
it has seriously curtailed the ability of citizens' groups both to file
competing applications for broadcast licenses and to challenge media
"monopolies" at license renewal time.
At this juncture, Professors Gillmor and Barron have introduced
their book of cases and materials on the "law of mass communications." No brief review of a book such as this can adequately
summarize its contents or achievements. Suffice it to say that the
authors' work is comprehensive, well organized, perceptively annotated, and a generally valuable contribution to students and
teachers of law and journalism.
Yet the ultimate value of this casebook may lie beyond its
excellence as measured in such traditional law school terms as
depth, thoroughness, and breadth. Gillmor and Barron's book, in
the words of its authors, is "the outcome of an interdisciplinary
collaboration between a professor of journalism [Gillmor] and a
professor of law [Barron]" (p. xi). The principal value of this
collaboration may stem from the fact that it provides students with
the perception and skills to resist some of the aforementioned recent and serious incursions on the freedoms of mass communications.
One example will suffice: the recent wave of subpoenas issued
by the Justice Department. From sketchy newspaper accounts, the
public has recently learned that the Justice Department has for
years and as a matter of standard procedure obtained from news
reporters-by formal subpoenas or informal cooperation-notes,
memoranda, and film to be used either as evidence in criminal
prosecutions or as "back.ground files" on allegedly "subversive"
persons. The following examples illustrate the type of demands
that have been put on the media:
During the lengthy trials following the demonstrations at the
Democratic Convention in Chicago, the local news media-especially broadcasting stations-received repeated subpoenas for news
film. Reporters said the practice was "an almost daily burden of
nearly unmanageable proportions. 'We are treated as evidence gatherers for the law.' "18
In connection with the Government's prosecution of David
Hilliard, a Black Panther leader from the West Coast, for allegedly
17. Congress has also been considering the "Failing Newspaper Act," S. 1520, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), H.R. 279, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which would permit newspaper cooperation otherwise barred by the antitrust laws. The bill, as amended on the
floor, passed the Senate and is currently in the House Judiciary Committee, and is
apparently destined for passage.
18. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 58.
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threatening the President, the Justice Department issued a subpoena
on January 8, 1970, for all CBS video tape (including "outtakes,"
the unused portions of the interview) made in connection with the
60 Minutes program on the Black Panthers, which was broadcast on
January 6, 1970. According to indications from Richard Salant, CBS
News President, CBS's initial response was to supply the requested
material.19
On October 2, 1969, the Justice Department subpoenaed all the
notes of a reporter from Fortune magazine, John McDonald, on an
interview with James Ling, head of Ling-Temco-Vought, in connection with an antitrust proceeding. It also subpoenaed McDonald's
tape recordings, documents furnished by Ling, and "the successive
drafts" of McDonald's article before it was published. While Fortune
was considering the request, officials from the Justice Department
visited the headquarters of Time, Inc., which publishes Fortune, and
appropriated the written material. Four months later the Department publicly apologized.2 0
19. BROADCASTING, Feb. 2, 1970, at 55. Apparently unsatisfied with even this broad
subpoena, the Justice Department-this time in connection with the Secret Service and
the FBI-issued a second subpoena against CBS on January 26, 1970, demanding
records of all correspondence, memoranda, notes, and telephone calls made in connection with the 60 Minutes Black Panthers program, including material relating to the
CBS interview in Algeria with Eldridge Cleaver, the Panthers' minister of information.
This second subpoena covered materials from mid-1968 to 1970. An unidentified legal
spokesman from CBS stated that the network might go to court if a "really solid"
freedom of the press question were raised, but he indicated that he wanted to reach
an accommodation with the federal authorities.
Richard Salant indicated at that time that CBS might supply the Government with
information in limited cases, even though it "might hurt journalistic functions."
BROADCASTING, Feb. 2, 1970, at 55. In February, however, CBS said that it might challenge subpoenas in "appropriate" cases, and Salant expressed his personal opposition
to the subpoena procedure. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6.
20. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1970, at 24, col. 4. In recent months, several other
cases of official pressure on the media have been made public. For example, following
the "Weathermen" incident in Chicago, in October 1969, the United States Attorney
demanded that Chicago's four daily newspapers, its TV stations, and Time, Life, and
Newsweek magazines tum over films, photos, and files on the incident. Time and Life
apparently complied; Newsweek made some effort to protect confidential informants;
and the newspapers apparently decided to tum over that information which the Government could not get elsewhere. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. Similarly, after the Chicago police raid on the Black Panthers in December 1969, "blanket
subpoenas" were again issued to the Chicago media, according to James Hoge, editor
of the Chicago Sun-Times. Apparently the Chicago media did not vigorously or publicly resist. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. The Justice Department also
recently subpoenaed all the notes and tape recordings of New York Times reporter Earl
Caldwell, made with Black Panthers during interviews dating back to the beginning
of 1969. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. At last report, however, the
Justice Department had "postponed indefinitely" its subpoena of Caldwell, Washington
Post, Feb. 11, 1970, at A-14, col. 6, and a federal court has ruled that Caldwell may
refuse to disclose the identities of his confidential informants until the government
makes a "clear showing of compelling and overriding national interest that cannot be
served by alternative means.'' In re Caldwell, 38 U.S.L.W. 2540 (N.D. Cal., April 14,
1970). The executive editor of the Washington Post reported that twice in the past
two years the Post has been asked to supply photographs for use in criminal actions.
The Post has refused both requests. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-4, col. 1.
Again, in 1968, following the April 1967 civil disorders in Washington, D.C., the

June 1970]

Recent Books

1461

Why did the media tolerate these serious incursions on their
journalistic freedoms for so long without even raising a public
outcry or protest? The answer, I think, lay in a "communications
gap" between journalists and lawyers. The journalists were unaware
of the legal methods available to resist the demands of the Justice
Department. And the lawyers, too often working as hired guns for
the corporate board rooms of large media conglomerates, either
failed to understand the serious chilling effect of these subpoenas
on journalistic freedom or simply placed the profit-and-loss statements of their corporate overlords above traditional first amendment
values.
Alan Adelson has reviewed the subpoenas controversy for Saturday Review in an article entitled, "Have the News Media Become
Too Big To Fight?"21 For four months, Adelson reported, the most
prominent news institutions turned over films and reporters' accounts of interviews and disturbances to law enforcement authorities.
Why had these institutions "neglected to defend fully the right to
privacy with their sources"?22 Adelson's conclusion is one that
serious students of the media should ponder long and seriously:
According to several accounts, the [media's corporate] lawyers
saw not only no alternative to complying with the subpoenas but
little reason not to. As Barton Clausen of the American Civil Liberties Union puts it: "Corporate attorneys don't even know about press
freedom." While that judgment may be a bit harsh, the accepted
practice for media attorneys is to worry about protecting first profits
and the stockholder interests, and then the freedoms and the prerogatives of the joumalists.23

According to Adelson, network officials at CBS admitted that "an
internecine conflict broke out between the news department and
the corporate lawyers over whether the network should deliver
its films and notes on the Black Panthers."24 According to another
account, attorneys for Time, Newsweek, and CBS "not only advised
against any hope of winning a court battle but suggested that everyJustice Department subpoenaed newsfilm and news photographs of TV stations and
newspapers. After conferences between the Department and the stations, some of the
film was viewed at the stations. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60. In addition, film
shot by cameramen from a Baltimore television station of the 1969 raid by the "D.C.
Nine" on the offices of Dow Chemical in Washington was subpoenaed and introduced
as evidence at trial. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60. Finally, at the trial of the
"Catonsville Nine,•• a group accused of burning draft files in Baltimore, air film as well
as "outtakes" were subpoenaed and used at the trial. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60.
21. SATURDAY REvmw, March 14, 1970, at 106.
22. Id.
2ll. Id.
24. Id.
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one keep the whole question quiet."25 It was not until Jack Gould
broke the story in the New York Times a week later that the public
learned of the industry-government deal. 26
Why, then, did highly trained lawyers react in ways so antagonistic to first amendment freedoms? Again, the answer may be that
journalists and lawyers do not communicate their values and concerns to each other. Law schools have generally not devoted much
attention to the law of "mass communications." Most students are
acquainted with this body of law only tangentially, through courses
in constitutional, copyright, or administrative law. Apart from a few
isolated cases concerning movie censorship,27 even constitutional law
courses deal primarily with books, magazines, newspapers, soap box
orators, and the occasional pamphleteer. Rarely do students come in
contact with the special problems of radio, television, cable television, telephone and common carrier regulation, communications
satellites, and the like. Moreover, to the extent that law courses
in "Communications" do exist, they are too often confined to the
technical aspects of administrative regulation, such as license renewal applications, transmitter changes, broadcast signal overlaps,
and fairness doctrine complaints.
Conversely, journalism schools have generally offered courses
designed to give their students only a brief acquaintance with some
of the legal pitfalls they may encounter in their profession-libel
and slander, deceptive advertising, copyright problems, and some
first amendment violations. Rarely are journalism students familiarized with such "legal" problems as rights of "access" by individual
citizens or groups to the facilities owned and controlled by the
mass media, rights of privacy, or the application of antitrust laws
to the press; and they are almost never given a thorough grounding
in the principles and values of freedom of speech or in the many
facets of broadcast regulation-diversification of ownership, the
fairness doctrine, ascertainment of community needs and interests,
and so on.
Gillmor and Barron's book bridges this interdisciplinary gap
with substantial success. Of the six major chapters, Professor Barron
has been the principal author for I, V, and VI: "The First Amendment Impact on Mass Communication," "Selected Problems of Law
and Journalism," and "The Regulation of Radio and Television
Broadcasting." Professor Gillmor has taken primary responsibility
for chapters II, III, and IV: "Libel and the Newsman," "The
Puzzle of Pornography," and "Free Press and Fair Trial."
25. Id. at 107.
26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1970, at 71, cols. 1-4.
27. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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Chapter I takes the student through the perplexing but ringing
debates over the "clear and present danger" test. As the reader makes
his way along the historic route of Schenk,28 Abrams,29 Gitlow,3 o
De]onge,31 Douds,32 Dennis,33 and Yates,34 he encounters some of
the most brilliant constitutional doctrine ever penned by the Justices
of the Supreme Court. He sees Justice Holmes, for instance, caution against "falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre," 35 create
the "clear and present danger" test,36 and remind us that "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market...." 37 He sees Justice Sanford warn
that speech alone may threaten revolution and that a "single revolutionary spark [of speech] may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a
time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration,''38
and he sees Justice Brandeis, two years later, counter with the
famous words: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of speech and assembly .... If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence."39 Throughout their discussion of the evolution of first
amendment doctrine, Gillmor and Barron carefully encourage the
student to draw contemporary implications from older precedent.
For example, drawing on Justice Holmes' "market place of ideas"
concept, the authors suggest that "[t]he 'market' Holmes is talking
about is basically what we call today the mass media..." (p. 16).
They then ask whether " 'free trade in ideas' [is] the distinguishing
characteristic of these media" (p. 16). This stress on the free flow
of ideas ties together the latter portions of the first chapter, which
are devoted to recent cases and ·writings on the theory-proposed
by Professor Barron-that truly free speech requires "access" to the
microphones, the television lenses, and the printing presses of the
mass media. Free speech, the authors suggest, cannot be free in a
closet. Rather, true communication requires both a speaker and an
audience, and that audience today is the audience of millions who sit
before their radio or television sets and read their daily newspapers.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
34. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
36. 249 U.S. at 52.
37, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) Oustice Holmes, dissenting).
38. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
39. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927) (concurring opinion).
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Chapter II systematically organizes and explores the law of libel,
but from the newsman's perspective as well as the lawyer's. Thus,
in addition to the more or less standard treatment of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan40 and its progeny, the authors delve into questions of damages, criminal libel, malice, burdens of proof, and-in
virtual hornbook fashion-the defenses against libel. The authors
also discuss the newsman's privilege to refuse to disclose his confidential sources of information-a subject which the recent subpoena controversy has dramatically brought to the public's attention. Chapter
II also contains a clear exposition of the "secondary" defenses to
libel-retraction and apology, reply, settlement, proof of previous
bad reputation, and reliance on a usually reliable source-and of
other facets of this difficult area which are particularly important
to newsmen.
Chapter III analyzes the law of "obscenity" and provides substantial historical, sociological, and anecdotal material on the problem.41
Law students in this area are too often trapped in a moral and
sociological wilderness with only the compass of well-worn legal
phrases to guide them. The authors seek to remedy this deficiency
by drawing upon materials from literature, psychology, sociology,
and the experiences of other countries. Although such terms as
"hard core," "patently offensive," "well beyond the bounds of
contemporary community standards," "socially redeeming interest,"
"pandering," "prurient interests," and "obscenity per quod" soon
begin to swim before the student's eyes-despite Justice Stewart's
contention that at least he knows it when he sees it42-the authors
have made the best of a difficult job.
One deficiency in chapter III, for my purposes at least, is the
absence of any discussion of standards for the control of "obscenity"
or "indecent" language over the broadcast media. To put the problem bluntly, if I Am Curious (Yellow) is cleared by the Supreme
Court for distribution in movie houses around the United States,
how should the FCC react to a network proposal to show it on
the "Nine O'Clock Movie" to a potential audience of sixty million?
Everyone is accustomed to reading four-letter words occasionally,
even in some of the nation's leading magazines. Reading, however,
is essentially a private activity, engaged in solely by the person in
whose hands the book or magazine is placed; hence those offended
by some of the oldest Anglo-Saxon words in the English language
have the simple expedient of not reading them. But what of radio
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. The authors note, for example, that "[t]he Illinois Vigilance Association dis•
covered in 1922 that jazz had 'caused the downfall' of one thousand girls in Chicago
alone .••• So laws were passed to prohibit the playing of jazz in public places ••••"
(p. 287).
42. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) Q'ustice Stewart, concurring).
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and television? Is television anything more than an electronic, public billboard? And how would the law react to public billboards
(electronic or otherwise) depicting scenes of intercourse or stating
familiar "four-letter words"? Traditional constitutional law analyses
have defined the concept of "obscenity" as material designed to
arouse prurient interests in sexual matters.43 Yet what form of
constitutional protection should be given to "four-letter words"especially when broadcast over radio and television? Individual
four-letter words may arouse a number of emotions in the average
listener but I rather doubt that a "prurient interest in sex" is one
of them. ·where, then, in that hierarchy of constitutionally protected forms of expression, are we to find the often-used, but
much-maligned, "four-letter word"? Gillmor and Barron's casebook
offers us little guidance in answering this question.44
Chapter IV, "Free Press and Free Trial," in addition to discussing Irvin v. Doud,45 the Oswald case and the Warren Report,46
and the Sheppard case47 and the Reardon Report,48 contains interesting materials on the use of cameras in the courtroom. Again,
the law student will benefit from the anecdotal material supplied
by the journalism professor, Mr. Gillmor. Chapter IV also devotes
a fascinating section to the liability of the American and English
press for "contempt of court" for statements about the parties or
the judge in a pending trial. Not many Americans know, for example, that if an English court concludes that a newspaper story has
had a "reasonable tendency" of "polluting the streams of justice," 49
it can hold the publisher, the editor, the reporters, or the printers
in contempt of court and commit them to prison. In 1949, for
instance, the editor of the London Daily Mirror was sentenced to
43. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
44. For the Federal Communications Commission's recently enunciated views on
"indecent language" over the airwaves, see Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHY-Fl\l), 18
P 8: F RADIO R.Ec. 2d 860 (1970) (FCC 70-346, released April 3, 1970), (Commissioners Cox
and Johnson dissenting).
45. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irvin, the Court vacated a murder conviction on the
ground that the defendant did not have a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors.
The Court found that the effect of widespread newspaper publicity was to create a
" 'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout the community," 366 U.S. at 727, a pattern which was reflected in the voir dire examinations
of the jurors who were finally placed in the jury box.
46. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE AsSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN
F. KENNEDY (1964).
47. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
48. The Reardon Report, prepared by the American Bar Association's Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press [Proposed Final Draft approved Feb. 19, 1968;
earlier version published under the title Fair Trial and Free Press (1966)], suggested
the use of the courts' contempt power against persons who had disseminated extrajudicial statements deliberately designed to affect the outcome of a trial during its
pendency. It is strongly criticized by Professor Gillmor (Pp. 372-78).
49. Barron 8: Gillmor (p. 420) (emphasis supplied).
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three months in prison and fined approximately 28,000 dollars when
the Mirror headlined the arrest of a murder suspect, "The Vampire
Man Held," in a rather obvious reference to the rumor that the
suspect drank the blood of his victims through a straw.50 Similarly,
when Newsweek magazine hinted that a relationship might exist
between an English doctor accused of administering overdoses of
sleeping pills and the legacies left him by his deceased patients,
Newsweek's chief European correspondent barely escaped a contempt citation from an English court, even though he had absolutely
no connection with the story. These materials on English law demonstrate the comparative freedom which the American press has for
comment on pending trials, and they thus place that freedom into
striking perspective.
Chapter V samples a number of lesser-known, but nevertheless
important, problems of law and journalism. Included are treatments
of access to- the records of governmental agencies (a subject in
which Ralph Nader is rapidly becoming expert), the freedom of
newsmen to travel to collect information, the rights of individuals
to resist the glare of publicity, and the problems of lobbying and
anonymous speech. Most important, however, the authors consider
a subject that is often overlooked in comparable studies-the interrelation of the antitrust laws and the freedoms of speech and press.
In early cases on this subject, the press had argued successfully that
the first amendment effectively exempted them from the sanctions
of the antitrust laws.51 The courts, however, have stood this notion
on its head-intimating in a number of cases that the first amendment may actually compel the equivalent of antitrust treatment
for the communications media. 52 As the authors suggest, the "market
place of ideas" is a sterile concept when all the newspapers and all
the radio and television stations in one community or state are
owned by the same person, entity, or corporation.
Finally, chapter VI acquaints the student with certain legal
and policy questions involved in radio and television broadcasting.
After discussing the rationale for the FCC's regulatory control
over broadcasting, the authors take the reader through an analysis
of the Commission's "balanced programming" concepts, the fairness
and equal-time doctrines, policies of the diversification of ownership rules, and problems both of new technologies-cable television,
pay-TV, and communications satellites-and of their impact on the
future of mass communications.
A reading of Gillmor and Barron's excellent 853-page treatment
50. The rumor, by the suspect's own admission, was subsequently confirmed as true.
51. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
52. See, e.g., Hale v. FCC, No. 22, 751 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1970), at 1, 7, 8·10 (slip
opinion) CTudge Tamm, concurring and citing further authority).
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of the law of mass communications may strike the reader with
an important but somewhat hidden aspect of constitutional law:
whereas literally hundreds of cases involving the limits of permissible-speech content have reached the federal circuit courts and
the Supreme Court-in areas of obscenity, group association, subversive activity, and so forth-not one case, to my knowledge, has
reached these courts in the past three decades concerning permissiblespeech content in the broadcasting media. This absence seems odd,
since booksellers, magazine publishers, and film distributors-starting with the famous test cases over Ulysses 53 and Lady Chatterley's
Lover54-have repeatedly gone to court to defend the people's
freedom to disseminate and receive ideas, concepts, and varying
forms of artistic expression. What accounts for the absence of the
broadcasters in this fight to defend first amendment freedoms?
The answer, I think, is twofold. First, broadcasters have stayed
so far away from the "experimental," the "innovative," or the "controversial" that they have never had to test the limits of free speech
in this country. Whatever else Green Acres, The Beverly Hillbillies,
or other mass-appeal programs may be, they scarcely appeal to one's
"prurient interests" or create a "clear and present danger" of fomenting ideas heretical to entrenched notions of national security in
this country. Second, even when broadcasters have occasionally, and
perhaps accidentally, strayed too close to the line separating mediocrity from creativity, they seem to have generally refused to seek
judicial protection for their first amendment rights. 55 When in such
cases the Government has subpoenaed information from the broadcasters or has imposed fines or other forms of punishment on them
for allegedly "subversive" programming, and when the broadcasters
have then been faced with the option of fighting in court or submitting to the Government, they have too often opted for submission.
The same willingness to comply with the Government at any cost
can be seen in the newspaper industry. For example, one commentator reported that a New York Times newsman "suggested to
an editor at the Times that his being subpoenaed to appear at the
Spock trial was a violation of the First Amendment guarantees of
53. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
affd., 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
54. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afjd., 276
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
55. The latest example of such acquiescence involved WUHY-FM. See note 44
supra. The FCC (Commissioners Cox and Johnson dissenting) fined WUHY-FM $100
for broadcasting allegedly "indecent" language. In so doing, the FCC created new justifications for bans on minority forms of speech over the broadcast media, hoping that
the licensee would take this important test case to the courts. Rather than fight, however, WUHY-FM decided to pay the $100 fine and the proceedings were terminated.
Apparently no appeal will be brought, and this dangerous Commission precedent will
remain on the books.
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press freedom . . . . But he says he was told not to make an issue
of it and to answer." 56
Gillmor and Barron's book will not supply intestinal fortitude
to industries known more for their acquiescence than their courage
in fighting for freedoms of speech. But it may encourage broadcasters
and journalists to push their skills to the limits of the first amendment, and it may give lawyers for the corporate media the commitment to support the broadcasters and journalists when they clo.

Nicholas Johnson,
Com missioner,
Federal Communications Commission
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